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9.1  Introduction 
On the whole, Canadians have  enjoyed exceptional economic and social 
growth over the past 35 years. Average incomes have been rising steadily, inter- 
national trade has increased substantially, and a highly skilled labor force has 
been promoted. In 1961, per capita GDP in Canada was 70 percent of that in 
the United States; by  1990 it had virtually caught up, to 92 percent, establish- 
ing Canada as one of the richest countries in the world.’ During the same pe- 
riod, a broad and extensive social safety net was entwined, which soon became 
recognized as one of the defining characteristics of the country. 
Yet, despite these past fiscal arrangements, it had become apparent in the 
early  1990s that the country’s method of  financing its welfare state through 
deficit spending could not be sustained. A slowdown of economic growth, un- 
derestimation of  debt-servicing costs, and lower than expected tax revenue 
base had led the ratio of total net debt to GDP in Canada to rise steadily, from 
11.3 percent in 1975 to 70.1 percent in 1995, the second highest level (next to 
Italy) among the G-7 countries.2  Moreover, should the government try to main- 
tain the 1995 level of  social programs without further reform, this ascending 
trend would continue. 
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1. Cairns et al. (1996) note that although this convergence was not unique, the degree to which 
it occurred in Canada was greater than for most industrialized countries. 
2. For purposes of consistency and international comparison, all references to government debt 
are based on a national accounts basis. 
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Over the past several years, the federal and 10 provincial governments have 
instigated a number of initiatives specifically designed to realign fiscal policy 
on a more sustainable path. Social policy has now been placed at the front of 
the political agenda, as individual programs are assessed for efficiency and 
effectiveness in light of current economic pressures. The reforms are intended 
to reverse the trend of spiraling interest costs-not  just for the following year, 
but for the coming decades as the population ages. 
This chapter applies the generational accounting approach to Canada, to 
examine whether these changes have been enough to actually reach fiscal bal- 
an~e.~  Despite persistent government deficits in recent years, the main findings 
suggest that Canada’s fiscal policy is at a state of  sustainability. The recent 
federal budget, the prevalent pattern of partial indexing of particular expendi- 
tures, and the anticipated payroll tax hikes for the Canada and Quebec Pension 
Plan (C/QPP) all have significant influence in reducing the estimated net tax 
burden on future Canadians. After these changes are factored in, future genera- 
tions are projected to face lifetime net tax burdens 3.  1 percent more than that 
of today’s  newborns under current policy. It would take, for example, only a 
0.1 percent hike in personal income taxes to remove this generational imbal- 
ance. That no further reform is required is due largely to these policies, which 
have not yet had their full impact on currently living Canadians. 
There is one chief cautionary note, however. Now that the federal deficit is 
set to become surplus by  around the turn of  the century, the government is 
considering using a portion of the surplus for either tax relief or more spend- 
ing. This may be myopic policy in that the large revenue requirements that will 
occur beginning around 2015 when the baby boomers start to retire are not 
taken into account. Simulating this policy using mainly income tax cuts over 
the first 20 years, I find the net tax burden on future generations would rise to 
a level 58 percent higher than that on current newborns. (For a more detailed 
look at the implications of not using the surpluses primarily for debt reduction, 
see Oreopoulous and Valliancourt [  1998bl.) 
Section 9.2 will outline in brief detail what has happened to Canadian fiscal 
policy since the 1960s. Section 9.3 will discuss the data sources used to calcu- 
late the generational accounts for Canada. In section 9.4, I present the main 
findings and provide a sensitivity analysis of the results. The impact from the 
recent federal budget and the projected changes to the C/QPP will be shown 
in section 9.5. Finally, section 9.6 summarizes and concludes the chapter. 
9.2  Canadian Fiscal Policy since 1960 
As in most other industrialized countries, the 1960s were a prosperous time 
in Canada. The country’s population was growing rapidly, with high fertility 
rates of 3.0 and more. Hence, the labor force was also increasing. Economic 
3. Generational accounting was first introduced by Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991). 201  Canada: On the Road to Fiscal Balance 
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Fig. 9.1 
Sources: Statistics Canada, National  Income and Expenditure Accounts, Catalogue no.  13-201 
(Ottawa: Minister of Industry, Science and Technology,  various years); Statistics Canada, National 
Balance Sheer Accounts, Catalogue no. 13-2  14 (Ottawa: Minister of Industry, Science and Technol- 
ogy, various years). 
Ratio of net debt to GDP 196&95  (national accounts basis) 
growth and productivity were very  robust. Real per capita GDP was  rising 
some 2.0 to 3.0 percent a year, while interest rates were barely higher than 
inflation levels. The unemployment rate averaged 4.9 percent for this decade, 
and the debt, relative to the size of  the economy, was on a downward track, 
falling from 27.2 to 17.1 percent of GDP (see fig. 9.1). In short, the 1960s was 
an affluent period in Canada, which brought promise and optimism. Sustained 
economic growth was simply taken for granted. 
Within this environment emerged a broad expansion of the Canadian wel- 
fare state. Policymakers could argue that these newly introduced or expanded 
programs were affordable by  appealing to the economic conditions existing at 
the time. There were three main developments. First, the Canada Assistance 
Plan (CAP), enacted in 1966, consolidated and enhanced the existing public 
assistance programs to meet "basic requirements" of welfare recipients. Sec- 202  Philip Oreopoulos 
ond, a comprehensive retirement pension program was also phased in. The 
pay-as-you-go Canada and Quebec Pension Plans were established  in  1966 
with the intent of  providing social insurance for workers and their families 
against loss of income due to retirement, disability, or death. Additional income 
security plans for the elderly were also incorporated: Old Age Security (OAS), 
the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIs), and the Spouse’s Allowance were 
introduced in 1952, 1967, and 1975, respectively, to provide revenues for indi- 
viduals who required additional support. Last, universal public health insur- 
ance was adopted by each of the provinces by the beginning of  1972. 
In the early 1970s, the federal government continued to expand its level of 
expenditures while posting only modest deficits and one budget surplus. The 
rise in spending was financed mostly by an increase in taxation, while govern- 
ment borrowing was kept at minimal levels. Prior to 1975, the primary account 
was in surplus, large enough that the ratio of debt to GDP maintained a down- 
ward  trend,  falling eventually  to  11.3 percent.  Demand  for debt reduction 
ceased to be a major issue. But ironically, this apathetic attitude toward debt 
reduction was the main reason for the beginning of debt creation? As the mag- 
nitude of debt decreased, fewer Canadians perceived it as a threat, and greater 
taxation  was deemed unnecessary. The federal government recognized  this 
shift in voters’ perception, and primary surpluses were finally allowed to be- 
come primary deficits, which led the debt-to-GDP ratio to steadily increase to 
18.2 percent by  1979. 
The situation quickly worsened after 1980. The rate of growth of national 
income consistently slowed, while the national unemployment rate doubled. 
The trend was not one particular to Canada. Almost all industrialized countries 
experienced smaller productivity growth during this period. What made Cana- 
da’s situation particularly grave was the added strain from the  1981-82  and 
1990-92  recessions, which were the most severe ones felt since the Great De- 
pression, and the worst out of all industrialized countries. In the 1981-82  reces- 
sion, real GDP fell 5.2 percent, real short-term interest rates rose to 7.5 per- 
cent, and unemployment rose from 7.5 to 12.5 percent. And in the 1990-92 
recession, real GDP fell by  3.2 percent, real short-term interest rates rose to 
10 percent, and unemployment rose from 7.8 percent to 11  .0 percent. Higher 
servicing costs resulting from the higher interest rates, coupled with a substan- 
tial rise in expenditures and lower revenues instigated by the 1981-82 reces- 
sion, produced a doubling of the debt-to-GDP ratio in less than a decade. 
The federal government was rather slow to react forcefully to its growing 
financial problems. It was not until  1987 that it recorded a primary surplus, 
which  amounted  to only  1 percent of  GDP. Federal  taxes  were  increased 
throughout the latter part of the decade, from 15.5 percent of GDP in 1979 to 
4.  Gillespie (1996) comments that the influences that led to the rise in relative debt since the 
mid-1970s are very different from all previous “waves” of debt creation. In the past, substantial 
increases in federal borrowing occurred during the financing of wars and depressions. 203  Canada: On the Road to Fiscal Balance 
18.0 percent in  1989. It was also during this period that certain welfare pay- 
ments were de-indexed to economic growth, or at least were no longer periodi- 
cally adjusted to keep pace with it. This would not have a significant impact 
right away. Relative federal program expenditures remained virtually the same, 
representing 15.9 percent of  GDP in 1979 and 15.4 percent in 1989. Despite 
the large increase in tax revenues, the federal government was unable to raise 
its primary budget above levels that would begin to lower the ratio of debt to 
GDP. To be sure, the speed of increase for this figure had slowed. However, 
the arrival of the 1990-92  recession, and the increased servicing costs from 
the debt, brought further escalation in the ratio. Between 1990 and 1995, the 
debt-to-GDP ratio climbed from 43.9 to 67.4 percent. 
The provinces, whose aggregate total spending is about the same as the fed- 
eral government, exhibited similar patterns of fiscal p01icy.~  Budget imbalances 
were usually small and fluctuated from deficit to surplus during the 1960s and 
1970s. As it had done to the federal government, the recession of  the early 
1980s impaired the fiscal positions of the provinces. But whereas the federal 
deficit continued to balloon, the deficits of  the provinces started to decline 
immediately and dramatically after 1983. The return to solid financial ground 
did not last long, however. The effort by the provinces to forestall further the 
need for borrowing was not enough to avoid the strain from the 1990-92 reces- 
sion. In general, budgetary deficits increased substantially. 
The 1990s saw concern about the unsustainable path of Canadian fiscal pol- 
icy snowball into a massive call for deficit reduction. Opinion polls reported 
that the public debt load was perceived as the most serious threat to economic 
stability. Several provinces were given strong mandates to take measures to 
control their spending. As a result, six of the ten provinces have produced, or 
are expected to produce by next year, a budget surplus, despite reduced trans- 
fers from the federal government. The two largest Canadian provinces, Ontario 
and Quebec, appear to be the slowest in dealing with their budgets, although 
Ontario has recently reduced its expenditures dramatically. On the federal side, 
the election in 1993 brought about a phenomenal makeover in Parliament. The 
Progressive Conservatives, who came to power in 1984 with the second largest 
majority in Canadian history, were reduced to 2 of the 295 seats in the House 
of Commons. Dissatisfied with the government’s inability to control its bud- 
gets, the electorate had made clear they wanted this practice reversed (although 
this was not the only factor contributing to the Progressive Conservative de- 
feat). The new government under the Liberal Party has instigated a number of 
reforms to reduce its overall expenditures, most notably in the areas of unem- 
ployment insurance and old age security. Large cuts to provincial cash transfers 
have been announced and will occur over the next three years. The provinces 
are, of course, upset about this, but their rhetoric suggests that they will accom- 
5. Kneebone (1996) and Wroberl(l995) provide more detailed accounts of the changing fiscal 
policies among the provinces. 204  Philip Oreopoulos 
modate the change without borrowing. Neither the provincial nor federal gov- 
ernments are keen to raise taxes. The past few years have seen ardent opposi- 
tion to higher taxes, and calls even to lower them. The Canadian governments 
have generally acknowledged this concern, allowing most of their changes to 
fiscal policy to come from expenditure cuts only. 
In addition to anxiety over current fiscal arrangements, the majority of Cana- 
dians perceive that their country will have difficulty in the future supporting 
its elderly population (Northcott 1994). This concern is not surprising. The fer- 
tility rate has fallen dramatically since its peak of 3.8 in 1959. A sharp contrac- 
tion occurred shortly after this time, with the rate dropping to 1.9 by  1973, and 
to 1.7 by  1985, where it has remained since. Net migration is large enough to 
offset the low fertility rate so that the total population in Canada is still grow- 
ing, although very slowly. The senior dependency ratio-the  number of Cana- 
dians over age 65, expressed as a percentage of the working-age population- 
is set to rise from 19.0 percent in 1995 to 36.3 percent by the year 2030 (Statis- 
tics Canada 1995). 
A number of  initiatives have been  implemented  to address  the concerns 
about an aging Canada. The National Forum on Health was launched in  1994, 
with the purpose of preserving, or improving, Canada's health care efficiency 
and effectiveness in the midst of the demographic transition. The most impor- 
tant and recent change made in order to anticipate future revenue requirements 
has been the readjustment to annual rises in C/QPP contributions. When these 
schemes were devised in 1966, it was expected that Canadians and their em- 
ployers would never have to pay more than about 5.7 percent of each individu- 
al's earnings to fund this pay-as-you-go scheme. But due to unanticipated dem- 
ographics, enriched benefits, and slower economic growth, this projection was 
grossly miscalculated. The Chief Actuary of Canada warned in 1995 that with- 
out further reform, contribution rates would have to rise from 5.6 percent of 
earnings in 1996 to 14.2 percent over the next 30 years to meet benefit commit- 
ments (Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions 1995). The fed- 
eral and provincial governments reached an agreement in February  1997 to 
speed up this process, setting contribution rates to rise from 5.6 to 9.9 percent 
over the next six years. This change in policy significantly reduces the extra 
burden of contributions over benefits that younger and future Canadians are 
expected to pay (Oreopoulos 1996a). 
9.3  Data Sources Used to Calculate the Canadian 
Generational Accounts 
Generational accounting methodology provides a means to assess the impli- 
cations of past borrowing by Canadian governments, in addition to current and 
expected reforms that would bring fiscal policy to a more sustainable path. 
Canada in particular is a country in which deficit accounting can give no mean- 
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and future generations. Projected rises in financial costs from the aging popula- 
tion and forecasted declines in costs from expected future budgets are simply 
not accounted for when referring to the government’s most recent deficit. 
To produce generational accounts for Canada, we require (1) a set of popula- 
tion projections; (2) projections of  average taxes, transfers, and government 
purchases by age and sex; (3) an estimate of government net debt for the base 
year (1995); and (4) a discount rate assumption. 
9.3.1  Population Data 
Age- and sex-specific population projections were obtained from Statistics 
Canada (1994) under official medium baseline forecasts up to 2041. Estimates 
were extended to 2100 using the same component assumptions prevalent at 
the end of that year. Specifically, the fertility rate remains at 1.70, while life 
expectancy rises from 74.8 and 81.3 years in 1993 to 78.5 and 84.0 years by 
2016 for males and females, respectively. Net migration between 2016 and 
2100 is 196,030, contributing to an overall increase in population during this 
period. A steady state is assumed thereafter. 
9.3.2  Fiscal Projections 
Projections for aggregated taxes and transfers begin with the 1995 official 
totals for all levels of  government (measured on a national accounts basis). 
These totals were further consolidated into more general categories, which are 
displayed in table 9.1. Our baseline results classify educational and health 
expenditures as implicit transfers, whose remaining present value amounts are 
allocated to specific generation cohorts and subtracted from overall net tax 
payments. The Social Policy Simulation Database and Model (SPSDM), pro- 
duced by  Statistics Canada, was used to distribute expenditures and receipts 
by age and sex.6  Data from Health Canada (1996) were also used for allocation 
purposes. In general, taxes were assumed to be borne by those paying the taxes. 
The one major exception was that corporate taxes were allocated according to 
wage and salary income. Elementary, secondary, and postsecondary expendi- 
tures were distributed according to profiles discussed in Cameron and Wolf- 
son (1994). 
Average tax payments and transfer receipts were projected forward by exam- 
ining historical, recent, and expected changes to these categories. Productivity 
growth is assumed to be 1.5 percent per year in the base-case results. All taxes 
increase in line with productivity, in addition to population served, and infla- 
tion. For transfers, several social programs have not remained in step with eco- 
nomic growth in recent years. Under current legislation, the government is only 
obliged to raise spending on a number of transfers by  inflation. Although, his- 
torically, these expenditures were increased discretely to keep pace with pro- 
ductivity changes, recent data show them growing at a lesser rate. Oreopoulos 
6. See Bordt et al. (1990) for a detailed description of the SPSDIM. 206  Philip Oreopoulos 
Table 9.1  Consolidated Government Expenditures and Receipts, 1995 
(percent of  GDP) 
Receipts 
Personal income taxes 
Capital income taxes 
Commodity taxes 
Property taxes 
Unemployment insurance contributions 
Workers’ compensation contributions 
C/QPP contributions 
Public pension conmbutions 
Other taxes 






Elderly benefits (OAS, GIS,  and Spouse’s 
Allowance) 
Social assistance 


































Source:  Statistics Canada, National Income  and Expenditure  Accounts, Catalogue no.  13-201 
(Ottawa: Minister of  Industry, Science and Technology, 1995). 
and Valliancourt (1  998) discuss the indexing assumptions for projecting social 
programs. Many of the transfers are assumed to grow only with inflation and 
population, or only in partial step with productivity. These include elderly ben- 
efits, social assistance, child tax benefits, C/QPP, and goods and services tax 
(GST) credits. Per capita real health care expenditures and general government 
purchases (excluding education) are projected to grow in line with produc- 
tivity.’ 
The three-year federal budget projection for 1997 is also included in the 
base-case results. Successive cuts in cash transfers to the provinces are as- 
7. Oreopoulos (1996b)  provides the motivation behind assuming health care expenditures grow 
at the same rate as productivity. Despite the much slower relative growth rates in such expenditures 
in recent years, a model of  real per capital public health spending regressed on lagged per capita 
real income shows that the slower growth can be explained solely by  the recession in the early 
1990s. Without further reform, real health expenditure per person is predicted to grow approxi- 
mately 1:l with productivity. 207  Canada: On the Road to Fiscal Balance 
sumed to be accommodated by reducing respective government purchases. Un- 
employment insurance reforms reduce unit costs initially and then grow with 
productivity. Tuition fees are increased by  10 percent by  2005. Finally, under 
current legislation, C/QPP contribution rates are increased from 5.6 percent of 
earnings in 1996 to 9.9 percent by 2002. 
9.3.3  Government Net Debt 
Consolidated net financial assets, as measured by  Statistics Canada’s Na- 
tional Balance Sheet Accounts, was used as the estimate for net government 
debt (or the negative of). Beginning in 1995, this amount was U.S.$374,801 
million, or 70.1 percent of GDP.8 
9.3.4  Discount Rate 
The discount rate used to convert amounts to present value was 5 percent. 
This amount was similar to those used in other studies for calculating particular 
unfunded liabilities for Canada (e.g., Canadian Institute of Actuaries 1995). 
9.4  Main Findings and Sensitivity Analysis 
Table 9.2 presents the base-case Canadian generational accounts for males, 
females, and both combined. The base year is 1995.  Educational and health ex- 
penditures are classified as implicit transfers. Productivity growth is assumed 
to be 1.5 percent, and the discount rate used is 5.0 percent. 
The accounts exhibit a life cycle pattern, with expected remaining net tax 
payments to the government peaking at age 25 for both males and females and 
then falling. The initial rise is due to younger generations’ approaching their 
heaviest taxpaying years. Present values become greater when the time period 
until actually realizing a payment or receipt gets smaller. The accounts decline 
for cohorts after age 25, as more taxpaying years fall into the past, and the time 
in which old-age-related transfers are paid becomes closer. The generational 
accounts for male cohorts aged 60 or older are negative, indicating that, on 
average, these generations will receive more in transfers than they will have to 
pay in taxes for the remaining portion of their lives. Generational accounts for 
females aged 55 or older are also negative. 
Since the accounts measure net tax payments for only the remainder of  a 
cohort’s lifetime, we  cannot use these values to compare burdens on living 
generations directly. Older cohorts are projected to pay little, or receive more 
from government than they will have to pay in taxes. But the taxes that these 
people paid in the past are not included in the results. The most useful informa- 
tion from this table can be gained from comparing newborn generational ac- 
counts with those for future generations, since remaining lifetimes for them 
are the same. 
Recall from chapter 2 that initially the generational accounts assume current 
8.  An exchange rate of  1.389 Canadian dollars per US.  dollar was used throughout this paper. 208  Philip Oreopoulos 
Table 9.2  Generational  Accounts: Base Case, Education as Part of Government 
Transfers (thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Present Value of Net Tax Payments 
Generation’s  Males and Females 
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22.7 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
policy will remain in place for living generations, while future generations will 
have to bear any residual net tax burden that would be required to satisfy the 
government’s intertemporal budget constraint (i.e., to make the government’s 
long-term fiscal policy sustainable). The burden is spread equally among the 
future cohorts, except for a productivity growth rate adjustment. In table 9.2, 
newborn males and females are projected to pay $56,300 in present value net 
taxes. This amount includes the expected three-year budget expenditure cuts 
and anticipated increases in C/QPP contributions in the future. On the other 
hand, Canadians-to-be are projected to be burdened by net taxes of $58,000, 
measured in present value, a $1,700 difference, or 3.1 percent more than what 
newborns face under existing policy. Thus the findings indicate that Canada is 
approximately at a state of fiscal balance such that no further policy reform 
would be required to maintain indefinitely the same net tax burden for all fu- 
ture generations (measured in proportion to earnings). 
A sensitivity analysis of  the base-case productivity  and discount rate as- 
sumptions is displayed in table 9.3. Smaller productivity growth will mean that 
future expenditures and receipts will be less than projected before. A greater Table 9.3  Sensitivity Analysis for Generational Imbalance 
g=1  g = 1.5  g=2 
r=3  r=5  r=7  r=3  r=5  r=7  r=3  r=5  r=7 
N  118.6  39.1  3.8  154.6  56.3  11.0  197.9  76.8  19.9 
F  130.7  47.1  12.2  158.0  58.0  14.1  191.5  72.9  17.9 
Percentage difference  10.2  18.9  218.7  2.2  3.1  28.2  -3.28  -5.1  -9.85 
AD  12.1  7.4  8.4  19.3  1.7  3.1  -6.4  -3.9  -2.0 
PIT  3.1  2.8  3.3  I .3  0.8  1.3  -2.1  -1.8  -2.3 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Notes:  g  is productivity growth (percent); r is discount rate (percent). 
between F and N (thousands of U.S. dollars). PIT Percentage increase in personal income taxes required to reach generational balance. 
N: Generational account for newborns (thousands of U.S. dollars). F  Generational account for future generations (adjusted for growth). AD: Absolute difference 210  Philip Oreopoulos 
discount rate will also cause expenditures and receipts to be lower, once they 
are converted to present value. Thus, in general, the larger the gap between the 
assumed productivity  growth and discount rate, the smaller the generational 
accounts, measured in absolute value. This effect will increase the percentage 
difference between generational accounts for newborns and future generations. 
A wide range of alternative productivity growth rates (1  .O,  1.5, and 2.0 percent) 
and discount rates (3.0,5.0, and 7.0 percent) was used. As shown, the percent- 
age differential between newborn and future generations’ net payments ranges 
widely. When productivity growth (g) is 1.0 percent and the discount factor (r) 
is 7.0 percent, the generational account for newborns is very small-$3,800. 
Consequently, the percentage difference of this payment with the $12,200 to be 
paid by future generations (after growth adjustment) is high-2  18.7 percent. 
Conversely, in the three cases where productivity growth is assumed to be 2.0 
percent and the discount rate varies among 3.0, 5.0, and 7.0 percent, percent- 
age differences between  newborns and future cohorts are actually negative, 
although not very different from zero. 
Examining absolute differences between the two accounts and magnitudes 
of policy changes shows, in general, that Canada is approximately at a state of 
fiscal balance, regardless of the assumptions used. When we examine the abso- 
lute difference, the amounts range from $6,400,  for the case when productivity 
growth is 2.0 percent and the discount rate is 3.0 percent, to $19,300, when g 
and r equal 1.5 and 3.0 percent, respectively. The magnitude of policy change 
required to remove any differential between the accounts is also minimal. For 
example, personal income taxes would have to adjust by either falling by 2.3 
percent for the case where growth is 2.0 percent and the discount rate is 7.0 
percent or rising by 3.3 percent when the growth and discount rates are 1  .O  and 
7.0 percent, respectively. Thus, while the imbalance measured by percentage 
differences between newborns and future generations varies considerably, the 
sensitivity for absolute differences and the policies required to remove the gap 
is relatively small. 
9.5  Alternative Policies 
The base-case generational accounts for Canada projected net tax payments 
for living generations under “current fiscal policy” conditions. Current fiscal 
policy was defined to include a number of reforms that are legislated, or ex- 
pected to take place in the future, as well as slower relative growth for certain 
transfer payments. It is useful to examine the extent to which these influences 
reduce generational imbalance. This section examines such cases, and in addi- 
tion looks at an alternative policy in which the federal government decides to 
cut taxes once budget surpluses begin to occur early next decade. 
Table 9.4  shows how  the generational accounts  (with males and  females 
together) would look with alternative projections for future budgets. Column 
(1) assumes all taxes and transfers are indexed to productivity, inflation, and 211  Canada: On the Road to Fiscal Balance 
Table 9.4  Effects on Generational Accounts of Expected Future Changes to 
Fiscal Policy (thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Generational Accounts: Males and Females Combined 
Generation’s 
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-  84.4 
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-68.5 


















-  84.4 
-79.8 
-68.5 
-  10.9 
58.0 
3. I 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Notes: Col. (1): All taxes and transfers indexed to population change, inflation, and productivity; 
no adjustments to budget or C/QPP. Col. (2):  Expected slower real growth for old-age security 
transfers, social assistance, child tax benefits, and GST credits. Col. (3):  Slower growth to trans- 
fers, and three-year federal budget forecast included. Col. (4): Base-case results: Includes slower 
transfer growth, 1996 federal budget, and legislated changes to C/QPP contribution rates. 
population. The 1997 budget forecasts and the legislated changes to C/QPP 
contributions are also not included in these results. The difference between 
newborns’ and future generations’ net tax payments is much larger than in the 
base case. Here, newborns are estimated to pay $39,900 in present value net 
taxes, while future generations would have to pay $110,944 to satisfy the gov- 
ernment’s intertemporal budget constraint (after adjusting for future changes 
to productivity). This represents a very significant generational imbalance of 
178.2 percent. 
This scenario no longer appears likely, however. Several social transfers, 
legislated to increase with inflation and population, are no longer fully adjusted 
to also increase with productivity. Column (2) examines the Canadian gener- 
ational accounts by  adding new projections for social transfers that accomm- 
odate this recent  trend  of  slower relative growth. The imbalance between 
newborns and future generations is reduced substantially, from 178.2 to 91.1 212  Philip Oreopoulos 
percent. The smaller fiscal burden on future generations comes at the expense 
of those currently living. Net taxes for living generations (except those 90  years 
of age) are increased-by  about the same absolute amount for those younger 
than 60 years old, and less so for older cohorts who will not be around long 
enough to experience the relatively smaller benefits. It should be understood 
that the real value of  these transfers to generations has not been reduced- 
they have only increased at smaller rates than productivity growth or remained 
constant in per capita terms. 
Column (3) uses the same tax and transfer projections but includes the three- 
year budget forecasts made by  the federal government in  1997. The genera- 
tional imbalance is further reduced as a result of these planned reforms-from 
91.1 to 45.6 percent. This decline is mainly due to cuts in cash transfers to the 
provinces. It is assumed that the provinces correspondingly reduce their own 
government purcha~es.~  Thus net tax payments for living generations are not 
significantly influenced by these actions. 
Column (4) displays the original base-case generational accounts shown in 
section 9.4. In addition to including the adjusted social transfer index assump- 
tions and the 1997 federal budget, legislative changes to the C/QPP have also 
been accommodated. Contributions to the C/QPP are raised from 5.6 percent 
of earnings in 1996 to 9.9 percent by 2002. Net tax payments for newborns are 
consequently raised from $49,400 to $56,300, while net tax payments for fu- 
ture generations fall from $72,000 to $58,000. This leaves a remaining genera- 
tional imbalance of 3.  I  percent. 
Thus, by factoring for these expected future developments to Canadian fis- 
cal policy, we are able to get a much better picture of the government’s ability 
to meet its bills than we would have had we only examined the recent upward 
trend in the Canadian debt-to-GDP ratio. The policies have substantial impact 
on reducing the overall net tax burden on future generations but have little or 
no influence on the recorded yearly deficit. Generational accounting’s dynamic 
approach of examining budgetary  effects over time reveals a much smaller 
generational imbalance compared to other countries, despite a significant aging 
of the Canadian population. The country is close to fiscal balance because the 
expected changes to fiscal policy will eventually affect those generations living 
now, even though they may not feel the effects right away. 
It is useful to examine the impact from speeding up the process of raising 
the contribution rates for the country’s pay-as-you-go pension scheme, the C/ 
QPP. Rather than increase contribution rates over a 40-year period, as legis- 
lated previously, rates are now set to rise over the next 6 years. Both policies 
cover the plan’s unfunded liabilities, but the impact on different age groups is 
different. Table 9.5 compares these differences. Column (1) assumes a 30-year 
9. As long as the provinces do not resort to greater borrowing to reconcile their budgets with 
this change, the reduction in the estimated generational imbalance will be about the same, whether 
taxes are increased, transfers reduced, or  government purchases diminished. 213  Canada: On the Road to Fiscal Balance 
Table 9.5  Change to Base-Case Generational  Accounts under Alternative 
Policy for Canada and Quebec Pension Plan Reform (thousands 
of U.S. dollars) 
Alternative: Raise  Base Case: Raise  Absolute Change 
Contribution Rates  Contribution Rates  from Alternative 
Generation’s  to 14.2% by 2025  to 9.9% by 2002  to Base Case 
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Source: Author’s calculations. 
transition, with contribution rates raised from 5.6 percent of earnings to 14.2 
percent.’O Column (2) shows the base-case generational accounts, which in- 
clude the 6-year transition of C/QPP contribution rates. 
As shown, the percentage difference between newborn and future genera- 
tion net tax payments is approximately the same for the 30-year and 6-year 
transition scenarios-3.1  and 3.0 percent, respectively. However, the absolute 
net tax burden on future generations is lower for the shorter transition period. 
The reason is that by increasing contribution rates sooner, the generations who 
would have retired before any significant contribution rate increases under the 
30-year transition are now required to pay more. This results in higher net taxes 
to be faced by  older generations (who are under age 65) and lower net tax 
10. The 6-year, 9.9 percent steady state contribution rate is equivalent to the 30-year,  14.2 per- 
cent steady state contribution rate in making the self-contained C/QPP program sustainable. In 
other words, both policies satisfy an intertemporal budget constraint for just the pay-as-you-go 
system of the C/QPP. Oreopoulos (1996a) discusses in more detail the intergenerational effects 
from such different paths to a sustainable Canada Pension Plan. 214  Philip Oreopoulos 
Table 9.6  Change to Base-Case Generational Accounts under Per Capita 
Income Tax Freeze until 2010 
Generation’s 
Age in 1995 
Alternative:  Absolute Change 
Base Case: No  Per Capita  from Base Case 
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Source; Author’s calculations. 
burdens for younger and future generations. Column (3) in table 9.5 shows the 
differences in generational accounts due to the shorter transition period. The 
biggest losers from the move to the shorter transition are the 35-year-old co- 
horts, who have to pay $2,600 more in present value net taxes for the remainder 
of their lives. The higher net taxes for the generations aged 15 to 60 reduce the 
required revenues for the younger cohorts. Future generations gain the most 
with the 6-year transition, having to pay  $2,400 less than under the slower 
transition scenario. 
With the rising trend in the debt-to-GDP ratio reversed and surpluses ap- 
pearing in some government budgets, many Canadians have  considered the 
option of tax relief or spending increases. As was mentioned earlier, however, 
a balanced budget now  does not necessarily correlate with a state of  fiscal 
balance. Much of the strain on the government’s finances will not be felt until 
beginning in 2015, when the baby boomers start to retire. If taxes are lowered 
or expenditures increased now, policy will have to be reversed later to afford 
the higher elderly costs. 
Table 9.6 shows what would happen if the government froze per capita in- 
come taxes at their 1998 levels until 2010, so that they are no longer growing 215  Canada: On the Road to Fiscal Balance 
in  step with productivity increases during this period. This policy is broadly 
similar to one designed to maintain balanced budgets during the same period 
using income tax reductions." In this case, some of the net tax burden on the 
current age groups is reduced. Newborns are estimated to have to pay $40,800 
in net taxes over their lifetimes, compared to the $56,300 under the base case. 
However, this policy is not sustainable, and at some point later on, the govern- 
ment will have  to increase taxes again, or reduce expenditures further. The 
lifetime net tax payment by  a cohort born in the future becomes $74,500 (ad- 
justed for growth), $16,500 higher than before. Thus, to the extent that the 
government relaxes its policies to reduce or eliminate budget surpluses early 
in the next century, the net tax burden on future age groups will rise. 
9.6  Summary and Conclusion 
Canada's fiscal situation worsened in the 1980s and early 1990s mainly be- 
cause of  slower than expected economic growth and two particularly severe 
recessions. The reaction by the federal and provincial governments was mod- 
est, and not sufficient to stop the debt-to-GDP ratio from growing dramatically. 
The worsening financial situation, coupled with the ominous aging of the pop- 
ulation, has caused the public to demand that the governments get their houses 
in order. Several policies have been implemented to respond to these calls, in- 
cluding large expenditure cuts already imposed or expected in the next few 
years and a slower pattern of growth for some transfers, in relation to produc- 
tivity changes. 
This chapter has applied the generational accounting approach to Canada to 
assess the sustainability of the country's current fiscal policy and its potential 
impact on living and future generations. The findings emphasize the impor- 
tance of  looking not only at borrowing done by  governments in the past but 
also at the financial resources that will be needed in the future. Under the base- 
case scenario, which includes factoring for contribution rate increases to the 
C/QPP, the net tax burden on future generations is estimated to be 3.1 percent 
more than for newborns, who face net taxes under the existing fiscal position. 
The magnitude of policy change required to remove the remainder of this im- 
balance is very small, indicating that Canada is just  about at state of  fiscal 
balance. 
The changes implied in restoring generational balance are permanent ones. 
Relaxing current policy now would impose a much greater burden on future 
generations, because of the effects from the demographic transition, which will 
not begin to have full impact until 2015. Yet, if the Canadian fiscal position 
remains on its current course, no further tax hikes, transfer cuts, or government 
purchase reductions will be required  to maintain fiscal balance. Canadians 
11. A more detailed discussion on this alternative policy scenario is given in Oreopoulos and 
Valliancourt (1998). 216  Philip Oreopoulos 
have not been a content bunch lately as a result of  recent restraint by their 
governments. But, at least, they can now see light at the end of the tunnel. 
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